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PUBLIC POLICY AND THE POLITICAL CRISIS
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
By ARTHUR NUSSBAUM t
I. THE ACTUAL USE OF THE PUBLIC POLICY CONCEPT
SINCE the appearance of Professor Lorenzen's pioneering studies on
the conflict of laws,1 that is, during approximately the last two decades,
many of the basic problems of the subject have received abundant and
illuminative investigation in this country. Yet the significance of one
important problem, that of public policy, which has recently come to the
fore as a result of the world political crisis, with its accompanying in-
congruities and tensions in respect to the various municipal laws, seems
hardly to have been recognized in recent legal literature. The purpose
of the present Article is to suggest the necessity of a reexamination of
the entire doctrine in the light of recent developments.
Although utilization of the public policy concept in Anglo-American
law is wide and varied, much confusion can be avoided if the various
legal uses of this concept are kept separate. One such use is affirmative:
public policy is relied upon in order to solve doubts as to the interpre-
tation of legal rules. This affirmative or interpretative function is par-
ticularly important in respect to statutory provisions of a penal char-
acter.2 Two other uses of the concept are negative or limitative. (1)
Public policy limits freedom of contracts, invalidating, for instance,
yellow-dog contracts or agreements in restraint of trade.' Comparable
to the contract use is the use of public policy in invalidating testamentary
provisions, for instance, because of the presence of illicit conditions.4
' Research Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
1. One might think principally of THE Co.'rFmxcT OF LAWs REu .a 'Gro BILLS .A.D
NoTEs (1919) and of such articles as The Renvoi Doctrine i: the Conflict of La-,es
(1918) 27 YALE L. J. 509, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 736, Territorialiy, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YA. n
L. J. 736. Some of Professor Lorenzen's articles were published before the World War.
See The Renvoi Theormy and the Application of Foreign Law (1910) 10 CoL. L Rzv.
190, 327, and The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in t:e Col:-
flict of Laws (1911) 20 YALE L. J. 427.
2. E.g., People v. Hawidns, 157 N. Y. 1, 12 (1878); State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St.
102, 109, 23 N. E. 747, 749 (1890) ; Sweeney v. Hunter. 145 Pa. 363, 22 Ad. 653 (1S91) ;
Chaffee v. Farmers' Corp., 39 N. D. 585, 593, 168 N. W. 616, 618 (1918); Mogul v.
McGregor, [1892] A. C. 25. The affirmative use of public policy, however, is not limited
to cases of this type. See, e.g., the utterance of Mr. Justice Holmes in TuE CoMM-xo1
LAW (1881) 35.
3. See GREENHOOD, THE DocTRnuNE OF PULIC POLICY ON TnE LAW OF CONM'rnCrS
(1886), and Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy (1935) 35 C,L L. REv. 679.
4. Mainly by invalidating certain legacy clauses and thereby the legacies themselves.
For American cases, see ATK IsOx, HANIuooK ON THE L.mw oF WILLS (1937) 351.
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(2) Public policy furthermore limits the application of foreign law (and
the recognition of foreign judgments').
This Article is solely concerned with the last, the "conflicts" function
of public policy.
It has invariably been assumed in this country, even by the most
liberal courts, that application of foreign law, though warranted under
the general conflict of laws rules of the forum, may nevertheless be
disregarded on the ground that such application would run counter to
the public policy of that forum. Thus, when the New York Court of
Appeals, in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,' deemed
itself bound to espouse the destruction of life insurance policies under
the law of Soviet Russia, the court still maintained that American judges
were not compelled to give effect to foreign laws contrary to our public
policy.
7
The conflicts use of public policy, or in continental terminology, "ordre
public," is a world-wide phenomenon. Significantly enough, there is, in
"international private law," scarcely a rule so common as the reservation
5. See p. 1056 infra.
6. 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934).
7. De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1873) is generally
and properly considered as based on public policy although this term is not used in the
opinion (which also employs, without clear distinction, another line of reasoning, see
note 74 infra). See In re Macartney, I Ch. D. 522 (1921). Frequently the public policy
rule is enunciated by the formula that "comity" does not require recognition of the foreign
law in question. See, e.g., Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommercheskey Bank v. Nat.
City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 35, 170 N. E. 479, 483 (1930) ; Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq.
219 (1884) ; Saxby v. Fulton, [19091 2 K. B. 208.
In listing pertinent cases, one must keep in mind possible differences in terminology.
The rule of public policy may be used without mention of the term [Siegmann v. Meyer,
100 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938)] or the rule may appear in the guise of a novel
juridical theory. Both forms were employed in the recent federal case, supra. The wife
of a New York resident had assaulted the plaintiff in Florida. The plaintiff brought an
action against the husband, who had not been in Florida, to recover damages for his wife's
tort. Suit was brought in a federal district court in New York. The lower court dis-
missed the claim, upon the ground that if the Florida law was applicable, the rule in-
voked by the plaintiff would be "too repugnant to the law of New York to be tolerated
in that state." The decision is a clear application of the public policy rule, although that
term was not employed.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, through Judge Learned Hand,
affirmed the judgment, basing the decision, however, upon the "local law" theory that a
New York court can enforce only New York rights and liabilities. Under the "local
law" theory, foreign law is never binding upon the courts of the forum, although it may,
as judge Hand puts it, furnish an appropriate "model" for the liability to be imposed by
the New York law. In the particular case, however, Judge Hand held that the Florida
"model" under consideration, which charges the absent and non-resident husband with
liability, could not be "accepted as a standard" in New York. "We have not been able
to find any similar case, and it is hard to imagine any other situation which would pre-
sent it." Although obscured by the rarely-used local law theory, this is really a decision
based upon the public policy doctrine.
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that, in appropriate cases, the foreign law will be abandoned and recourse
had to the lex forL Historically, the rule developed earlier in Anglo-
Saxon than in continental law. The contracts use of the public policy
concept can be traced back to the fifteenth century," and its conflicts use
to the eighteenth century,9 whereas the continental public policy doctrine
took its rise in the middle of the nineteenth century.1" But despite the
longer tradition, the range of application of the conflicts use of public
policy is somewhat narrower in modern Aknglo-American, and particularly
in American law.
One reason for this difference is that Anglo-American law as to
capacity, marital status, inheritance and other "personal" relations is
principally determined by the domicil of the parties, while under con-
tinental learning such law is determined by their nationality. Since law
suits are usually conducted in the domicil of the defendant, there is much
less opportunity, under the domicil rule, for the application of foreign
law. Another factor in the trend, appearing particularly in American
law, is the expansion of the concept that "procedure" is always governed
by the lex fori. Under the procedural theory, important chapters of
private law, such as the statute of limitations," damages,'- conversion
of foreign money' 3 and receivership 4 have more or less been placed under
the control of that law. Furthermore, some corollaries of the public
policy notion have become independent conflict of laws propositions in
Anglo-American law, i.e., non-recognition of foreign penal laws"5 and
impossibility of performance due to foreign law.'" Moreover, so far
as this country is concerned, there is a relative paucity of international
S. See Knight, Public Policy in En.qlish Law (1922) 38 L. Q. REv. 207.
9. Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. T. Hard. 85 and 194, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 and 125 (1735);
Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1034, 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 721 (1760); Falliot v. Ogden,
3 T. R. 726, 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (1789).
10. By Savigny's discourse on the "limits. in space, of rules on legal relations" in
his SYSTEM OF PRESENT ROMAN LAW (1840) (SYSTEM DES HEtTIGEN: R6.IscRExn
REcHTS) translated under the title TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE LIMITS
OF THEm OPERATION I\ RESPE cT OF TIME AND SPACE (Guthrie trans., 2d ed. 1S0). Sa-
vigny does not use the term "ordre public," but he possesses its conception. On the his-
tory of that term, see note 101 inlro.
11. See STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS (1939).
12. See STUMmERG, op. cit. supra note 11, at 146.
13. NusSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAw (1939) 427, 464.
14. One has to think more particularly of the rule which denies foreign receivers
authority within the forum. STTIMBERG, op. cit. supra note 11, at 424.
15. See STUMMERG, op. cit. supra note 11, at 953.
16. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Actiengeselischaft, 15
F. Supp. 927 (S.D. N.Y. 1936), aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), crt. deicd,299
U. S. 585 (1936) ; Vainetta Velvet Co. v. Kakana Ka, Ltd., 256 App. Div. 341, 10 N. Y. S.
(2d) 270 (1939); Kleinwort, Sons & Co. v. Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie, 55 T. L.
R. 814 (C. A. 1939), and earlier cases cited in these decisions.
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litigation.'" American conflicts cases are, in their overwhelming ma-
jority, interstate in character and therefore less affinitive to public policy
problems which primarily originate in international relations. Never-
theless, the importance of the matter is on the ascendant in American
as well as in English law.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
The continental public policy theory stems from the proposition that,
in each legal system, there are certain norms which the forum should
not dispense with in favor of a divergent foreign law: for instance,
norms of monogamy, of prohibition of slavery and of unenforceability of
gambling contracts.' 8 Much labor has been spent to define these "prohi-
bitive" norms and to secure tests for fair distinction and classification,1"
but it is familiar learning that these attempts have failed. Yet there
may be norms suggested by the original public policy doctrine which
the forum will carry through against any foreign law applicable, in a
particular instance, under general conflicts rules. An early English deci-
sion suggested a frequently repeated instance by hypothetically referring
to a prostitute's suit for her wages which an English court never would
allow, although the claim be recognized by foreign law." Such a foreign
law probably does not exist,2' but there are a few cases which seem to
indicate that the forum would consider prohibitions against the enforce-
ment of certain contracts, such as gaming and usury contracts, as abso-
lutely binding upon the court notwithstanding any foreign law to the
contrary.22 It may even be imagined that under the stress of present
political world crises certain principles of humanity, in the spirit of the
Declaration of Independence, would be considered "inalienable," regard-
less of foreign law.
In general, however, a foreign law which in itself is repugnant to the
forum will be accorded recognition where the repercussion of that law
upon the forum is remote and unharmful.23  Although the forum abhors
17. Even the absolute number of international conflicts cases is considerably less than
one should expect considering the size and importance of the United States' foreign trade.
This phenomenon cannot be considered here.
18. This is particularly the idea advanced by Savigny in the discourse cited supra
note 10.
19. Knapp, La Notion de L'Ordre Public dans les Conflicts de Lois (Thesis, Neuf-
chatel, 1933) gives a helpful survey of that literature.
20. Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1084, 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 721 (1760).
21. GoomucH, CoNnvicr oF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 257, n. 3, states that no actual in-
stance of such a suit has been found.
22. See note 36 infra.
23. For writings mostly continental on this problem, see Knapp, op. cit. supra note
19, at 51 et seq. Cf. also Lewald, La Regl~mentation De L'Ordre Public Sur i Ter-
rain Des Traites Diploinatiques (1928) 23 Rav. DROIT INT. PmvA 149.
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polygamy, it will, nevertheless, recognize the legitimacy of a child born
abroad in a polygamous marriage entered into and valid abroad. -2' All
depends on the circumstances, or, more precisely, on the importance of
the "contacts" of the case with the territory of the forum. Only an
actual, strong and adverse25 interest of the forum will prompt the court
to refuse the application of the foreign law that would govern under
general conflict of laws rules. This is the doctrine of the "relativity"
of public policy or "ordre public," or the doctrine of relativity according
to contacts, as distinguished from the comparatively less important rela-
tivity of public policy in space and time, which latter simply means that
views on public policy change with territories and epochs.2
Courts all over the world act, on the whole, in accord with the rela-
tivity principle, although in continental cases the language may some-
times be adversely influenced by misleading conceptions, drawn from
theoretical controversies on the nature of public policy.- r The absence
of such controversies has been advantageous to Anglo-American develop-
ments. Using the traditional technique of the common law, the English
and American courts have succeeded in building up, without misleading
formulas, a flexible and intrinsically sound public policy doctrine, to
which the relativity of public policy is a matter of course.28
The state of Anglo-American juristic theory on public policy is less
satisfactory, however. Dependence of the theory of public policy on
contacts with the forum - the "relativity ratione materiae" - has hardly
been recognized, 9 although this point is actually of great importance.
It was referred to in a comment"0 on the recent New York case of
Holzer v. Deutsche Reiclhsbahngesellschaft. In that case, a German
non-Aryan, an employee of the German Railway Company, had been
dismissed under the non-Aryan laws of 1933, before the expiration of
his employment contract. The lower court had allowed the employee's
claim for indemnification, disregarding the non-Aryan law for reasons
24. See vox BAR, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PRWvATm I:.mNTIONAL LAW
(1892) 96.
25. See RFSTATE T, CONFLicr OF LAWS (1934) § 612.
26. Relativity in time is referred to, e.g., in Straus Y. Canadian P. Ry., 254 N. Y.
407, 413, 105 N. E. 653, 655 (1914) (regarding the changes in the law on carriers' liabil-
ity); Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 2SS (1921) (regarding
the changes in the law of arbitration).
27. For German instances, see NussB-um, DETrrscns INTER.NATIONALES PrnvAT-
RECHT (1932) 65, n. 4.
28. Practically all of the English and American public policy cases exhibit a "weigh-
ing" of the contacts involved. See particularly note 35 infra. An earlier and forgotten
case of this type is Forbes v. Scannel, 13 Cal. 242, 276 (1859).
29. Thus not even in Healy's lectures, TlIoria 96iz&alc do l'ordre public, 9 HAU-,
AcADmiE DE DRorr INT., RECuRmL DFS CounS (1925) 407, 411-557.
30. Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1463, 1470. See (1937) 23 VA. L. RM. 23, 2%5;
(1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1490, 1492.
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of American public policy,3' but the Court of -Appeals reversed in an
opinion strongly emphasizing the lack of contacts warranting the use of
the public policy rule. 2 The decision, the substance of which shall not
be discussed here, is understandable only in terms of the relativity doc-
trine.33 This has been contested by one commentator 3' who, however,
did not consider the court's unmistakable language. The commentator
asserted that there are New York cases inconsistent with an approach
based on contacts, but the instances given are unconvincing.3, Moreover,
it is not inconsistent with the relativity doctrine to hold certain foreign
rules so repugnant to the policy of the forum that no recognition should
be given to them regardless of contacts. However, it is difficult to find
specific instances. There may be an important contact justifying the
use of public policy, although the court's reasoning does not explicitly
refer to the existence of that contact.30
31. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft, 159 Misc. 830, 290 N. Y. Supp. 181
(Sup. Ct. 1936).
32. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. (2d) 798
(1938).
33. The court relied mainly on the following sentence from the Dougherty case, su pra
note 6: ". . . . it cannot be against the public policy of this state to hold nationals to
the contracts which they have made in their own country to be performed there according
to the laws of that country." Dougherty v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 90, 193
N. E. 897, 903 (1934).
34. See (1938) 38 CoL. L. Rv. 1490, 1493, n. 17.
35. Barth v. Backus, 140 N. Y. 230, 35 N. E. 425 (1893). denied effect on New York
property of an involuntary assignment of property under Wisconsin bankruptcy laws.
This is a self-sustained rule of conflicts of laws, now adopted by the RESTATEMENT, CoN-
FLICTS OF LAws (1934) § 264. Meacham v. Jamestown R. R., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E.
653 (1914), refused to recognize the validity of a Pennsylvania agreement to arbitrate.
While Hogan, J., gave public policy as a reason, Judge Cardozo in a convincing concurr-
ing decision pointed out that arbitration is procedural. Moreover, the defendant being a
New York corporation, there were sufficient contacts with the forum. In Strauss v. Cana-
dian Pac. Ry., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 560 (1930), an exculpatory clause in a foreign
through bill of lading was held invalid under New York law. The strong contact with the
forum was manifest since the bill of lading called for delivery in New York.
A commentator further asserts that three other cases which might be explained on
the contact basis are unclear, [(1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1490, 1493, n. 18], but gives no
reason for this criticism. In reality most of the cases confirm the relativity rule, with the
exception of Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 142 N. E. 703 (1925)
which is no "public policy" case at all; jurisdiction over an equitable right of action was
denied because the plaintiff's claim was considered "too tenuous."
36. Thus in Fox v. Postal Telegraph Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399 (1909), a
provision in the contract, limiting the defendant's liability for orderly delivery of the tele-
gram, was held void as violating the public policy of Wisconsin. No Wisconsin contact
was mentioned in the decision, but doubtless the defendant had branch establishments in
Wisconsin. The ruling, therefore, greatly affected Wisconsin interests. An absolute use
of the public policy rule, however, seems to exist in the following two cases. In Folsom
v. Continental Adjustment Corp., 48 Ga. App. 435, 172 S. E. 833 (1933), the court applied
the Georgia usury statute despite the absence of Georgia contacts to a small loan, charac-
terizing the interest rate agreed upon as "unreasonable and unconscionable." This is,
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IWhile with respect to reliance on contacts, Anglo-American cases, on
the whole, are in accord with continental decisions, some divergent fea-
tures of American doctrine must be mentioned. One feature has been
elaborated in Bradford Electric Light Company, Incorporated v,. Clap-
per.3" There the defendant company had employed the plaintiff's husband
as a lineman in New Hampshire where he was killed in an accident dur-
ing the course of his employment. Employer and employee were both
Vermont citizens. Against the plaintiff's suit, brought in a New Hamp-
shire court for workmen's compensation, the company set up a defense
that the action was barred by the Vermont Workmen's Compensation
Act. The plaintiff insisted that this provision of the Vermont statute
was contrary to the public policy of New Hampshire (and hence inap-
plicable). The Supreme Court of the United States, however, refused
to accept this replication:
"A state may, on occasion, decline to enforce a cause of action.
In doing so, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the
plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere.
But to refuse to give effect to a substantive defense under the ap-
plicable law of another state, as under the circumstances here pre-
sented, subjects the defendant to irremediable liability. This may not
be done. ... ."38
The result is that the court is divested of its power to discard a foreign
law for reasons of public policy, as soon as the foreign law is invoked
by the defendant.
Common carriers sued in American courts for damages have repeatedly
advanced as a defense exculpating clauses, valid under their own law,
and have been held liable because the foreign rule on such clauses ran
counter to American public policy.3" According to Mr. Justice Brandeis'
theory, the carriers should have won because they pleaded the foreign
law in the capacity of defendants. But such a result would be puzzling.
True, Mr. Justice Brandeis had before him an interstate situation, a
fact which teclmically may be used to narrow the effect of the case as
nevertheless, not the general attitude of American courts in usury cases. See Ntussn.%n.,
MONEY IN THE LAW (1939) 245. In Oscanyan v. Winchester Arms Co.. 1Q)3 U. S. 261
(1880), the Court refused to consider a Turkish law according to which the plaintiff, a
representative of the Turkish government, was allegedly permitted to agree with the de-
fendant company on a commission for the sales of arms to the Government. That cause
of action was deemed "so repugnant to all our notions of right and morality that it can
have no countenance in the courts of the United States:'
37. 286 U. S. 145 (1932).
38. Id. at 160.
39. See cases cited ifra notes 43 and 44, and Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pac.
Co., 58 Wash. 239, 108 Pac. 613 (1910).
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precedent, but logically the argument carries over to international situa-
tions. The argument does not stand analysis. Is it justifiable to award
the defendant a more favorable position in matters of public policy or
to deprive the court in any stage of the judicial process of the power
to protect the interest of its state by the use of that concept? Mr. Justice
Brandeis doubtless felt uneasy in giving the law of one American state
precedence over the law of a sister state, and this sentiment led to inde-
cision which, in reality, favored the defendant. However, the federal
court stands in the shoes of a state court, and has to look exclusively to
the law of that state, notwithstanding the fact that courts of another
state may decide differently. This is but an aspect of the broader phe-
nomenon that a party liable under the law of state A is sometimes not
liable under the law of state B. A corrective, if any, could only be secured
by the evolution of uniformity of the law concerning jurisdiction.
Fortunately, the doctrine of the Clapper case, though not yet overruled,
is isolated4" and unlikely to be followed in the future. It is true that
Section 612 of thie Restatement mentions public policy only in connection
with "actions,"'" but the omission of defenses seems to be an oversight
due to the unfortunate "vested right" theory which was adopted by the
fathers of the Restatement. The official comment does not suggest that
public policy should not operate where foreign law is relied upon by the
defendant. In fact, the contrary was held by the Supreme Court in an
earlier case,4" and in a number of cases by lower federal 43 and by state
courts.44 In the Bradford case itself, Mr. Justice Stone, in a tense con-
curring opinion, implicitly rejected Mr. Justice Brandeis' theory. Actu-
ally, no vestige of anything resembling that theory is found in the ex-
tensive continental and English literature on public policy.
Another peculiarity of the American doctrine of public policy is per-
haps related to the philosophy behind the Clapper case, i.e., the legal
effects of the use of the public policy rule. In an outstanding opinion,
40. Apart, perhaps, from Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930), opinion
written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, where the seeds of his theory may already be found,
41. "No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created in another state
the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." RESTATE-
MENT, CoxrIcT OF LAWS (1934) § 612.
42. The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263 (1902).
43. Northern P. R. R. v. Kempton, 138 Fed. 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905) ; Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; The Fri, 154 Fed.
333 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907).
44. Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 58 Wash. 239, 108 Pac. 613 (1910);
Meacham v. Jamestown R. R., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (1914); Frenkel & Co. v.
L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 243, 167 N. E. 430 (1929) ; Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny
Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930); Vladi-
kavkasky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934).
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Loucks v. Standard Oil Company,4" Judge Cardozo took the view that
the courts must "decline jurisdiction" and "close the door to the plain-
tiff" when his foreign right is denied for reasons of public policy; but
if the claim is allowed, then jurisdiction must be assumed. Apparently
these formulas purport to make it clear that the losing plaintiff may try
his luck in any foreign court unhampered by the judgment rendered.
Still it is questionable whether this is the proper way by which to achieve
a desirable end. Suppose the defendant is held liable, because his defense
is rejected under a public policy of the forum. The judgment then is
undoubtedly on the merits. It cannot be otherwise, where the plaintiff's
claim is rejected on the same ground. In fact, where the foreign right
claimed by the plaintiff is not recognized in the forum, there is no right
at all left for judicial disposition. Hence, the forum has simply to dismiss
the claim, just as in the case of any other action involving a cause of
action not recognized by law. The relation of Judge Cardozo's theory
to that of the Clapper case consists in the court's sentiment that the use
of the public policy argument must not have a definitive effect - in the
Clapper case, against the defendant; in the Loucks case, against the
plaintiff.
Certainly the plaintiff should not be prevented from bringing suit in
another jurisdiction. On any theory, the judgment rendered says no
more than that the vindicated claim was not recognized because it violated
the forum's public policy. Hence recognition of this judgment under the
full faith and credit clause should not stand in the way of a fresh action
by the same plaintiff in another jurisdiction." In such a situation, the
courts of the sister state, the law of which was denied recognition, should
certainly be held empowered to turn the public policy argument against
the judgment. As a result, no need exists for a jurisdictional theory.
Still there is a certain ircination of English and American courts, ex-
plicable perhaps by historical reminiscences,41 to couch choice-of-law
problems in jurisdictional terms.4" While here and there this language
may simply be considered as indeliberate and inaccurate, such inter-
pretation does not seem permissible in view of judge Cardozo's explicit
and recurrent phraseology. Obviously, a definite jurisdictional view is
45. 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
46. See the opinion of the Reichsgericht, infra note 50.
47. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORy OF EGLISH L.kw (1924) 117 et seq., 140 et seq.,
and the valuable article of SACM, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law
in 3 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRUsS (1937) 342.
48. For instance, Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907), and
Sweeney v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363, 22 Ad. 653 (1891) are in the writer's opinion concerned
with questions of substantive law, despite their jurisdictional phraseology.
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behind it. But this view has not been generally accepted in this country.49
Again, on the continent there is no vestige of it."
In the Loucks case, the jurisdictional theory did not affect the outcome
of the case, the defendant being held liable for other perfectly sound
reasons. It did not even prejudice the persuasive flow and consistency
of Judge Cardozo's opinion. The confusing effect of the underlying
theory appears, however, in Mertz v. Mertz,"' where a New York wife
sued her husband for damages because of injuries suffered in Connecticut.
The Connecticut law, unlike the New York law, allows such suits between
husbands and wives. Upon appeal, Judge Lehman demonstrated at
length, citing the Loucks case, that the Connecticut rule was against
public policy. To bolster this argument, theories of jurisdiction and
remedies were employed. As a consequence, the complaint was dismissed
on the ground that New York, "while recognizing the wrong, denies a
remedy by attaching to the person of the spouse a disability that cannot
49. The language of the courts is ordinarily indifferent. The frequent expression
that the controversy turns on the "enforcement of an obligation" (of the debtor) speaks
rather in favor of a substantive law theory of public policy. See, e.g., Walsh v. New
York & N. E. Ry., 160 Mass. 571, 36 N. E. 584 (1893) ; comment to § 612 of RESTATE-
MENT [p. 1034 supra), although far from being clear, seems to support the same theory.
However, Watson v. Murray, 23 N. J. Eq. 257 (1872), denying, for reasons of public
policy, enforcement of a foreign lottery transaction, already employs jurisdictional lan-
guage.
In suits between non-residents, assumption of jurisdiction is sometimes made dependent
on the fact that the cause of action is not contrary to the public policy of the forum.
Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664 (1896) ; Hudson v. von Harem,
38 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927) ; Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P. (2d) 63
(1932). Here public policy appears within a veritable jurisdictional setting. But one may
doubt whether in fact more is involved than exercise of the discretion conferred upon the
courts in such situations.
50. The problem underlying the American cases was touched upon by the Reichs-
gericht, 29 Entscheidungen in Zivilsachen 90 (June 9, 1892). In the port of Reval (Estho-
nia), an English ship through the negligence of her obligatory Reval pilot had injured
a Dutch ship. A suit for damages brought against sureties of the English shipowner was
dismissed by the Reichsgericht on the ground that according to German public policy a
shipowner is not responsible for acts done by an obligatory pilot. The case is one of the
not too numerous German cases which unduly expand public policy inasmuch as the rela-
tivity principle was entirely overlooked by the court. Perhaps feeling the weakness of
the position taken, the court remarked: "Dismissal by the German court [italics the
court's] means but that the plaintiff's claim cannot be enforced within Germany. This
judgment does not claim to dispose of the plaintiff's right absolutely. ["schlechlhln"].
The plaintiff is not prevented from prosecuting his right in the court of another state
whose laws who do not preclude his claim . . . even should those courts ordinarily en-
force German judgments." While this statement consoling the plaintiff was unnecessary,
it was accurate in describing the lack of any extraterritorial effect of the judgment. But
it did not occur to the Reichsgericht that the controversy turned on the point of jurisdic-
tion.
51. 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
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be removed by the law of another state. The law of the forum deter-
mines the jurisdiction of the courts, the capacity to sue or to be sued,
the remedies which are available to suitors and the procedure of the
courts."' 5 - Of course, the elaborate discussion of public policy was out
of place, but here too, the weakness in reasoning did not affect the
soundness of the result which was justifiable according to the procedural
theory.
3
III. THE RESERVE OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COURTS
IN THE USE OF PUBLIC POLICY
The most striking feature of Anglo-American law with regard to
public policy is easier to describe than to define in legal propositions.
This feature is the courts' dislike of public policy- the uneasiness ex-
hibited by them where circumstances impose consideration of the public
policy rule. True, antipathy to public policy is by no means confined
to common law countries. To the continental systematicians of inter-
national private law, it is the "Cerberus" lying at the threshold of the
international private law,54 an enigmatic ' 5 monster which shows no desire
of being analyzed, and which defies the concerted attacks of professors,
daring thesis writers 6 and treaty makers.' Still, continental courts differ
from juristic writers in this respect. Much as they are subject to the
52. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 473, 3 N. E. (2d) 597. 600 (1936).
53. The objections by GoODaICH, CoxFicr OF LAws (2d ed. 1938) 231, n. 45 result
from his general aversion against the use of the public policy argument which he appar-
ently considers the basis of the opinion. This interpretation of the opinion by a leading
expert in the field brings home the inadequacy of the language used. Poling v. Poling,
116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935) is an analogous case decided on a purely public
policy basis.
The question of theoretical accuracy becomes more important with respect to textbooks.
A vestige of the jurisdictional conception may be found in Parmele's annotations to
WHATON'S Co NrLcr oF LAws (3d ed. 1905) 1118 ct seq. The more recent American
textbooks seem definitely to be influenced by justice Cardozo's view. So excellent a guide
as Stumberg's Conflict of Laws, presents the general discussion of public policy and special
discussions as to contracts, torts and foreign judgments in the chapter on Procedure
[(1937) 150 et seq.] Public policy is there affiliated, or rather confused, with purely pro-
cedural matters such as forum non conveniens, litigations between non-residents (see note
49 supra) and the hesitancy of the courts to assume jurisdiction in matters interfering
ith the internal management of foreign corporations. No such organization is used by
English and continental authors.
54. See Leivald, supra note 23, at 152.
55. 1 BARTIN, PRINCiPFs DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvi (1930) 210.
56. For comprehensive bibliographies on continental public policy doctrine, see
Knapp, La Notion de l'ordre Public dans les Conflits de Lois (Thesis, Neufchatel, 1933) ;
Lienhard, La Role et la Valeur de l'ordre Public (Thesis, Dijon, 1934) ; Cf. also KMmz,
AmmTSVERTRAG UND Oanan PuBuc (1933). The disproportion betveen the amount of
writings on the subject and the value of the results attained is frightening indeed.
57. See Levald, supra note 23; Knapp, supra note 56, at 132 ci seq.
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influence of legal learning in the conflicts field, continental judges have
never hesitated to employ the public policy weapon. If in this respect
their course is open to objection, it can only be for an exaggerated use
of that weapon." English and American judicial opinions, however, in
uncommon union with continental systematicians, are full of regrets and
excuses for public policy. Since 1824, Judge Burrough's "unruly horse"
has become the symbol of that mental attitude: "once you get astride
of it, you never know where it will carry you."D0 Quotations of this
remark6" and other judicial warnings"' on public policy are frequently
made by English and American courts. Quite preponderantly the cases
in question are concerned with the contract use of the public policy
concept, the courts in question refraining from that use for acceptable
reasons.
Since the World War, however, the public policy problem has entered a
new phase. Revolutionary and destructive legislative inroads into national
and international economics have shifted the focus of public policy to
the conflicts area. Here, perseverance of the old tradition, under changed
conditions, has led to highly unsatisfactory rulings.
In Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 2 the New York
Court of Appeals was concerned with ruble policies issued before 1917 by
the defendant's Petrograd branch to persons who, with one or two ex-
ceptions,63 were Russian citizens. In 1919, when many of the insured
had ceased to be subjects or residents of Russia, the policies were can-
celled by a decree of the Soviet Government. 4 The suits brought by
58. A number of earlier German, French and Italian cases is listed by 1 KAiIN,
ABHANDLUNGEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1928) 247, n. 132. For further
and more recent German instances see NUSSBAuM, DEUTSCHES INTERNATIONALES PaI-
VATRECHT (1932) 66, n. 2, and the case supra note 50. Regarding the attitude of French
courts, Cf. WOLFF, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1933) 41. A striking Norwegian in-
stance is referred to in NuSSEAUAI, MONEY IN THE LAW (1939) 396, 1n. 76.
59. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
60. In re Kelcey, [1899] 2 Ch. 530, 534; In re Smith, [1914] 1 Ch. 937, 946; Htigston
v. Bell, 185 Ind. 536, 544, 112 N. E. 883, 886 (1916); Veytia v. Alvares, 30 Wis. 316,
247 Pac. 117 (1926) ; and other cases.
61. See Fendor v. St. John Mildway, [1938] A. C. 1, 10, 11 (1937) and cases listed
there; McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 329, 189 N. E. 234, 236 (1934), (1935) 44
YALE L. J. 873. It is remarkable that in Egerton v. Bronslaw, 1853/4 H.C.L. 1 (1853)
the contract-use of public policy in so far as it exceeded the "policy of well established
law" was maintained only with great difficulty.
62. 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934).
63. One exception is referred to by Judge Lehman, concurring, at 104, 193 N. E. at
909. The majority opinion, at 78, 193 N. E. at 898, mentions that "the policies were all
bought . .. by Russian citizens," but at 83, 193 N. E. at 900. speaks of "Russia where
all the insured were, with one or two exceptions." Although the latter remark seems to
envisage the year 1918, it should probably be related to the time of contracting.
64. True, the company's Russian assets had been confiscated by the Bolshevist Gov-
ernment, but they were, or would have become, worthless anyhow due to the depreciation
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the insured for payment were dismissed by the court, partly on the ground
that the ruble contracted for had evaporated. But the majority of the
court based the dismissal also on the view that the policies had been
validly cancelled by Soviet legislation. The court took the position that
there were not sufficient contacts for the use of the public policy rule.
However, the insurance company was American; a fact doubly material,
because the independence of the company amidst disquieting Russian
conditions, together with the high reputation and the large resources of
the Equitable, offered strong incentives to prospective Russian policy
holders. Of course, cancellation of policies without compensation meant
a profit to the American insurance company, but securing profits of that
type obviously is no reason for withholding the public policy argument,
and nothing in the judgment suggests that the court was influenced by
such considerations.
Further contacts were present, such as the fact that a few of the
insured had not been Russian citizens at the time of contracting(" and
more of them were not residents of Russia at the time of the hearings.
The possibility that American citizens or residents were among the insured
must be assumed in the absence of statements to the contrary, since the
judgments must be understood to cover all claims presented. Thus, the
contacts were clearly sufficient to warrant resort to public policy.
In addition to the alleged lack of contacts, the majority's opinion offers
another argument for not using public policy. The People's Commissariat
of Justice had decreed, with the force of law, that the cancelling ordinance
"had no application" to contracts of life insurance made by Russian sub-
jects with companies having assets in the United States. The objective
of the decree was manifest: the Soviet Government wanted to preserve,
as a precious asset for subsequent confiscation, insurance claims in dollars
or rubles enuring to Russian citizens and possibly collectible in the United
States, then the gold standard country par excellcnce. But the court,
using its own judgment, read into the Commissariat's decree a limita-
tion to the effect that only contracts made in New York or to be per-
formed here according to New York law were envisaged by the exemp-
tion; the reason being that "naturally" such contracts "could not" be
affected by the cancellation. This construction made the Soviet decree an
innocuous essay in American private international law, with the result
that cancellation without compensation was wvidened by the American
of the ruble. To this extent the company %%as more than protected by the simultaneous
depreciation of the ruble policies. A part of the premiums paid on the Russian p~licies
had probably been transferred to this country. The court does not discuss this point nor
do the reasons given by the majority refer to the confiscation of the company's Rus-ian
assets.
65. See note 64 supra.
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court. But at least the cancelling ordinances were saved from the inroads
of public policy.
In the Dougherty case, dismissal of the complaints was warranted
because of the annihilation of the ruble. There are, however, cases the
disposition of which entirely depend on the public policy argument. They
exhibit even more the trend appearing in the Dougherty case, namely, an
endeavor to eliminate the foreign law indirectly by utterly tenuous argu-
ments rather than by frank resort to public policy."0 Restrictive inter-
pretation of the foreign law, by an ipse dixit of the court contrary to
the true intent of the foreign legislature, is a familiar device. Thus in
First Russian Insurance Company v. London & Lancashire Insurance
Company, 7 Romer, J., exempted the London Branch of the Russian
company from the effects of the Russian nationalization decrees, nega-
tiving, with no support in the text of the decrees, the statements of the
expert on Russian law whose testimony was not challenged.
Exactly the same thing happened in Moscow Fire Insurance Company
v. Bank of New York & Trust Company. 8 The United States, as assignee
of the Soviet Government, claimed, by way of intervention, the proceeds
of the liquidation of the company's New York branch, the proceeds being
held by the defendant. The court denied the Government's claim and
subjected the liquidation of the New York branch entirely to New York
law. The court's assertion in this case that the Soviet Government had
itself territorially limited the legal effects of its nationalization decree 0
contradicted not only the expert testimony but the fact that the Soviet
Government, by its assignment, had ascribed to its own decree a different
meaning. Moreover, despite the court's contention, dissolution of a jur-
istic person is necessarily intended to affect, though indirectly, all of its
assets wherever situated.70 Repercussions of the dissolution in the New
66. The decision of the Reichsgericht of Nov. 14, 1929, in the Viennese loan case,
126 Entscheidungen in Zivilsachen 196, discussed in NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW
(1939) 383, offers a continental instance. The lower appellate court had in a neat and
cogent opinion reached the sound result by an explicit use of the public policy argument.
The over-artificial dialectics of the Reichsgericht reasoning in obscure conflicts terms met
with unanimous disapproval of the commentators: 29 SoNTAc,, BANKARCHIV (1930) 360;
NEUMEYER, INTERNATIONALES VER.VALTUNGSRECHT (1930) 111(2)(3) 323, n. 17; Hein-
rici, (1930) JuRISTISCsE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1855; Reichel, 1930 id. at 2209; K;ssler,
1931 id. at 148. The court apparently was afraid to touch upon Austrian sensibilities and,
perhaps, to create, by the use of the public policy argument, a precedent which might be
turned by foreign courts against similar German enactments. NussBAuM, MONEY IN THE
LAW (1939) 357, n. 4. K6ssler, for example, speaks of the court's "diplomatic" reason-
ing.
67. [1928] Ch. D. 922.
68. 280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939), 49 YALE L. J. 324.
69. See the referee's statements as quoted. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New
York & Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 286, 306, 20 N. E. (2d) 758, 765 (1939).
70. The counterarguments advanced by Rippey, J.. dissenting, appear convincing in
this respect. Id. at 314, 20 N. E. (2d) at 769.
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York area certainly may be curtailed here, but only by means of the
public policy concept 1 or by specific legislation.
Although not exactly in point, the English case, Sedgwick, Collins and
Company v. Russia Insurance Company of Petrograd,72 is relevant here.
Long after the nationalization of the Russian company, a writ had been
served on its former agent in London, on its behalf. The validity of
the service was questioned. Said Bankes, L. J.,; "Any civilized nation
whose national takes advantage of our municipal law in order to secure
a business footing in this country, will observe and recognize the condi-
tions upon which the national takes that advantage."73 From this premise
Lord Bankes drew the conclusion, which he considered as not subject
to doubt, that the Soviet Government would recognize the validity of
the service and that this event might be anticipated. He could validly
have drawn the conclusion that he would not consider the Soviet Govern-
ment as civilized in case it would deny the recognition. This statement,
however, would not have carried much weight, as no less an authority
than Lord Scrutton, dissenting, gainsaid Lord Bankes' theory on the
assumed obligation of the Soviet. Nor was there the slightest factual
foundation for Lord Bankes' conclusion. Essentially the case amounts
to a reductio ad absurdum of the interpretative technique used in the
decisions previously discussed. 4
While the number of cases which originated in the Russian Revolution
is gradually melting away, litigation arising from foreign impairment
of contract obligation through exchange-control, abrogation of gold
clauses, compulsory reduction of interest rates and similar measures are
coming more and more to the fore. Particularly injurious in the inter-
national field is foreign exchange-control legislation which makes transfer
of money over the country's frontiers dependent upon government license
and which may result, as it did in Germany, in a sweeping prohibition
71. See note 104 infra.
72. [1926] K B. 1.
73. Id. at 8.
74. The use of that technique is not limited to the decisions mentit-ned. In a manner
not so gross it appears, for instance, in Washington Alaska Bank V. Dexter Horton Nat.
Bank, 263 Fed. 204 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920). The Seattle bank, a creditor of the bankrupt
Washington-Alaska Bank, which had been incorporated in Nevada, %as denied payment
by the Nevada receivers because under the Nevada Banking Law "depositors" and "hold-
ers of exchange" enjoyed a preference in the funds of the debtor company. The ciurt
sitting as an Alaskan court, held the Nevada statute inapplicable to the creditor's rights
flowing from an Alaskan transaction, a decision certainly justifiable from the dievp:int
of Alaskan public policy. However, the majority of the court based the decision upon an
unconvincing interpretation of the Nevada law into which the majority read a territorial
limitation, not deductible from the text of the preference provision. Obviously the ad-
judication must have been the same if the Nevada law did not contain such a limitation.
In De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1873), the court found
in the provisions of the French Civil Code on alimony, by way of mere speculation, an ill-
defined "local character" not indicated in the text of the Code. In this case, also, the
public policy argument was cumulatively used, although not in so many words.
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of transfers necessary for the payments of debts. Courts have been almost
unanimous in disregarding foreign exchange-control legislation. Outside
the United States, courts have relied on public policy and related formu-
las. 75 In this country they have, in the great majority of cases, availed
themselves of the accidental fact that under the contract the foreign
debtor had to make payment in America so as to subject the contract to
American law." This criterion is unsatisfactory. In olden times when
transportation of money was quite a venture, the place of payment was
actually an important factor in shaping the debtor's obligation. Under
modern banking practice, the place of payment carries little weight, except
in outmoded legal theory.
7
Moreover, even under the place-of-payment theory, the question remains
whether the German or other foreign debtor is exonerated because of
impossibility of performance, brought about by foreign exchange-control.
In a well-reasoned opinion, a New York federal district court rejected
the impossibility defense on the theory that the debtor might have been
able to make payment out of funds held here. 8 The court had not been
informed, it seems, that exchange-control also forbids debtors to make
payments from funds held abroad; such funds being subject to repatria-
tion as soon as conditions permit. The rule under which impossibility
due to foreign law is not a good defense7" offers the creditor a stronger
protection, but is predicated upon the applicability of American or Eng-
lish law. Still this prerequisite may be absent. The problem before us
appears there in its clearest form.
In two cases, 80 German debtors had agreed to make payment in Holland.
Their impossibility defenses were rejected by a New York court, mainly
75. See NUSSBAUm, MONEY IN THE LAW (1939) 488. Also Hooge Raad of the
Netherlands, May 26, 1939, (1939) NEDERLAND 'SCHE JURISPRUDENTIE 1386, (1939) IN-
STITUT JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL BuLL. 90, regarding the loan of the Osram Company;
Appellate Court of Colmar, March 11, 1938, (1938) NOUVELLE REVUE DE DRoIT INTER-
NATIONAL PRIVA 699.
76. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15
F. Supp. 927 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied,
299 U. S. 585 (1936) ; Perry v. North German Lloyd, 150 Misc. 73, 268 N. Y. Supp. 525
(Mun. Ct. 1934) ; Gl ynn v. United States Steel Works, 160 Misc. 405, 289 N. Y. Supp.
1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Sheppard v. Hamburg-Amerikanische-Paketfahrt Actiengesell-
schaft, N. Y. L. J., Mar. 14, 1934, p. 1232, aff'd, N. Y. L. J., Apr. 6, 1934, p. 1653 (App.
Term), leave to appeal denied, see Glynn v. United States Steel Works, supra, at 409;
Deutsch v. Gutehoffnungshiitte, 168 Misc. 872, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 319 (Sup. Ct. 1938);
Barnes v. United States Steel Works Corp., 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 161 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Kleinwort, Sons & Co. v. Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie, T. L. R. 814 (C. A. 1939).
77. See NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW (1939) 225.
78. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft,
supra note 76.
79. See note 27 supra.
80. Lann v. United States Steel Works Corp., 166 Misc. 465, 161 N. Y. (2d)
951 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Friedrich Krupp Aktiengesell-
schaft, 169 Misc. 445, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 993 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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on the ground that, under Dutch law, German exchange-control legis-
lation did not furnish a valid excuse for the debtor's default. This Dutch
rule, however, is merely the expression of Dutch public policy, a fact
3vhich was perhaps not explained to the court. From the viewpoint of
an American court, there is no reason to prefer Dutch public policy over
German public policy. There is only one kind of public policy which
an American court must heed; namely, American public policy, which
may require the court to safeguard the interests of American residents.
The problem of inapplicability of American law was also presented
in Goodman v. Deutsch Atlantische Telegraphen Gesdlschaft.8' Suit had
been brought on bonds which were issued in this country by the de-
fendant, with a New York company as trustee. The trust deed expressly
stated that the obligations of the defehdant were "covered" by the law
of Germany. The defendant, alleging German exchange-control, refused
payment The court overruled the defense, but at the same time vigor-
ously opposed the public policy argument. By the use of that argument,
the court was unwilling to "assume a pharisaical attitude and thank
Providence that we are not like other people." The opinion also passed
strictures on "American investors who seek high percentage rates on
foreign bonds" (the bonds in question bore seven percent per annum).
The inevitable conclusion of these premises seems to be dismissal of the
complaint. But no, the court found that the contract, though explicitly
"covered" by German law, was implicitly "governed" by American law.
For this reason, German exchange-control did not come into play. Hence,
what was evidently necessary for reasons of public policy was attained
in a round-about fashion which was by no means preferable to a frank
reliance on public policy.
There is only one case in which an American court has yielded to
German exchange-control legislation, a case in which the suit of an
Austrian emigr6 for payment of her account with a Prage bank was
dismissed. The absence of an American place of payment proved detri-
mental to the plaintiff; and the court itself expressed uneasiness over
its disposition of the case.
82
British and French Trust Corporation v. New Bruswick Railway
Companys' is a conspicuous case concerned with foreign gold clause
abrogation. In 1884 the defendant had issued bonds in terms of "£E100
gold coin of Great Britain of the present weight and fineness," payable, at
the option of the holder, in London or in New Brunswick. After Canada,
in 1937, had abrogated gold clauses, 4 the English Court of Appeal, as
81. 166 Misc. 509, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 80 (Sup. Ct. 193S).
82. Werfel v. B6hmische Escomptebank, N. J. L. J., July 20, 1939, p. 161.
83. [193S] 4 All E. L. R. 747.
84. Statute of April 10, 1937; see (1937) 37 I.sT1Ttr JLtuMIQUE IT ,IATIoAL
BuL.L. 109.
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well as the House of Lords, on a suit brought by bondholders, held the
New Brunswick company liable for the full gold amount as promised.
Non-recognition of foreign gold clause abrogation, for reasons of public
policy, has repeatedly been enunciated by the highest courts." Thus in
the New Brunswick case, English contacts warranting the use of the
public policy rule were amply present, particularly in the alternative
English place of payment, the English currency and the flotation of the
loan in England. But the courts shunned this argument. The Court of
Appeal86 advanced a novel theory according to which the "measure" (as
distinguished from the "manner") of the debtor's performance is con-
trolled by the law of the place of performance. This theory has been
criticized elsewhere 7 and was abandoned by the House of Lords. The
highest English court, however, in a most striking way, used the device
discussed above to read into the Canadian statute limitations excluding
its application to the case at bar, contrary to the manifest intention of
the Canadian legislature.
The Canadian Act was shaped after the American Joint Resolution
of June 5, 1935.88 While the American law abrogates only gold dollar
clauses, at least in its text," Section 4 of the Canadian act goes further:
"In the case of any gold clause obligation governed by the law of
Canada payment in Canada or elsewhere, in money other than money
of Canada tender of the nominal or face amount of the obligation
in currency which is legal tender for the payment of debts in the
country in the money of which the obligation is payable shall be a
legal tender and the debtor shall, on making payment in accordance
with such a tender, be entitled to a discharge of the obligation."
The £ 100 bond of the New Brunswick Railway Company clearly came
under this provision. It constituted a "gold clause obligation;" it was,
as admitted by the court, "governed by the law of Canada ;" it was pay-
able, not in Canada, but "elsewhere" (in London) "in money other
than money of Canada." Consequently "tender Df the nominal or face
amount," i.e., tender of £ 100, in English currency ("currency which is
legal tender for the payment of debts in the country in the money of
which the obligation is payable") was "a legal tender," and the company,
on making payment in accordance with such a tender, was "entitled to
a discharge of the obligation," notwithstanding the fact that the latter
ran in terms of £100 gold.
85. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW (1939) 392-394 (Dutch, German and Swiss
decisions).
86. British & French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. Co., [1937] 4 All E. L. R.
516.
87. Drunsfield v. British Insulated Cables, Ltd., [1937] 4 All E. L. R. 382.
88. 48 STAT. 112, 31 U. S. C. § 463 (1933).
89. See, however, Guaranty Trust Co., Trustee, v. Henwood, 307 U. S. 247 (1939).
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But the Lords looked upon the situation in a different way. Lord
Mlaugham, with whom the other Lords in substance agreed, pointed out
that "questions that arise as to the validity or form of a tender, or the
advantage of making one in a particular form, are questions of proce-
dure for the lex fori." Under English law a mere tender of money,
so the argument runs, would not discharge the debt; a tender conforming
to the rules of court would only stop the running of interest and shift
the burden of cost to the debtor. "I cannot think that the legislature
of Canada was attempting to alter the course of procedure in any country
except Canada." 90 The baffling result is that Section 4 must be confined
to actions brought in Canada.
Yet there is no foundation for the assumption that Section 4 is pro-
cedural in nature. Tendering money may be part of a judicial procedure;
in itself it is not. 1 In the case of Section 4 there is not the slightest
hint of a procedural objective. The words of the section italicized in
the following - "tender of the nominal or face amount of the obligation
shall be a legal tender and the debtor . . . shall be entitled to a
discharge of the obligation" -were not heeded by the Lords in their
purely literal analysis. Those words make it clear that nothing short of
a curtailment of creditors' rights was intended by the Canadian legis-
lature. The creditor was to be divested of the right to enforce more than
the nominal amount of the obligation. The whole act is a measure of
substantive law just as is the American Joint Resolution. The near
possibility of such an unstrained interpretation of the Act was not con-
sidered by the courts. NVe refrain from elaborating other objections to
the theory of the court.92 In the proceedings before the Court of Appeal,
nobody, not even plaintiff's counsel, had hit on that theory nor has it
been advanced in foreign litigation over the Canadian Act."3
Canada struck back. In 1939 she enacted with retroactive force a new
Gold Clause Act making impossible any further misinterpretation of the
type which had occurred. At the same time the enforcement of foreign
judgments, not in harmony with the new Act, was forbidden."
90. British and French Trust Corp. v. New Brunsv, ck Ry., [1938] 4 All E. L IL
747, 757.
91. See NUsSBAU-M, op. cit. supra note 85, at 37.
92. The court's construction of the Canadian Act implies that foreign (English)
money would have to be paid into the Canadian court. By a strange coincidence, such a
proceeding was held unlawful, and duly so by the Privy Council in the same volume in
which the decision of the House of Lords was first reported. Pyrmont v. Schott, [1933]
4 All E. L. M. 713, 713.
93. judgment of the Hooge Raad of the Netherlands, April 28, 1939, (1939) IrNE-
LAND 'SCHE JURISPRUDENTIE 1377, regarding the Canadian gold dollar loan of the ?,Mes-
sageries Maritimes.
94. Gold Clauses Act, 1939. See (1939) 41 INsTItU- JUtlr2UE ITNXnMNATIONAL
BuLL 84.
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IV. APPRAISAL OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION
REGARDING PUBLIC POLICY
How is the hesitation of the English and American courts in the use
of the public policy rule explainable?
In some cases, special reasons account for the attitude of the court.
In the New Brunswick case, the court probably felt the pressure of the
decision in Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Foreign
Bondholders,9" where the House of Lords had taken off the shoulders
of the English Government and taxpayers the formidable burden of the
gold clause of the Morgan war loan. Should public policy be allowed
to recognize foreign gold clause abrogation in the interest of domestic
debtors, but to deny recognition where recognition would principally
prejudice domestic creditors? Perhaps. It will be seen that the problem
is not an ethical one. It would, however, have been an act of enlightened
judicial statesmanship to pay for the advantages obtained from foreign
gold clause abrogation, by squarely accepting its disadvantages.
Regarding the Moscow Insurance case, it has been correctly pointed
out in an able comment 9" that the court was precluded from direct reliance
on public policy by United States v. Belmont,97 where the state courts
were sternly admonished for interfering with international agreements
of the Federal Government, even in cases involving the public policy
of a state. Besides, it would be a strange thing, indeed, for an American
court to turn, for reasons of "public policy," against the Government of
the United States.
But these searches into the special motives of individual cases do not
tell the whole story. The hesitant attitude of the courts towards public
policy is a general phenomenon which demands a more comprehensive
explanation. Dislike of presumptuousness, of a "pharisaical attitude" is
suggested as a rationale in the Goodman case, and similar views have
occasionally appeared elsewhere. s But certainly not much importance
can be attributed to this motive. All things considered, the numerous
highest courts of civil and common law countries which have availed
themselves of the public policy argument cannot possibly be reprehended
as hypocritical. The remark in the Goodman cases rests on misappre-
hension. Conflicts use of the public policy concept means merely that
in the case of strongly conflicting policies, a court must follow the local
policy rather than the policy of a foreign state. This limitation upon
the recognition of foreign law may be considered as somewhat political,
but in no event does it involve an ethical stricture on the foreign law.
95. [1937] A. C. 501.
96. (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 324.
97. 301 U. S. 324 (1939).
98. See, e.g., Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918)
27 YALE L. J. 656; Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies (1938) 25 VA. L. REv. 26.
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A foreign law may run counter to the public policy of the forum, albeit
the forum possesses a similar law. Thus the Hooge Raad of the Nether-
lands, for reasons of public policy, has denied recognition to Canadian
gold clause abrogation even though the Netherlands herself had, at that
time, abrogated gold clauses."9
The vagueness and triteness of the public policy concept has perhaps
exerted some general influence upon the course of the courts. A student
once declared: "I have believed so far that 'public policy' is a phrase
for 'empty heads.'" Of course, the student was thinking of class occur-
rences where a professor would question a student on the rationale of
a decision and the student, unable to find a specific answer, would take
refuge in "public policy," and then, perhaps, be called an "empty head"
by the questioning professor. It is the affirmative or interpretative use
of "public policy" which, through its looseness and ubiquity, has brought
that concept into disrepute. A terminological, or perhaps psychological
difficulty affecting all uses of the term has been created thereby, which
does not exist to the same extent in Continental doctrine. The correspond-
ing term of ordre public,100 customary also outside the French language
countries, is not employed in the interpretative sense. The "contract use"
of ordre public is historically important, but has actually become insig-
nificant.101 The result is that ordre public has become more or less a
technical term of private international law, easily fitting into the fabric
of juridical thought. It lacks, so to speak, the peculiar triteness of the
public policy phrase.
Nevertheless, the basic vagueness of the conflicts-use of public policy
and of ordre public is the same, and it is particularly this vagueness which
has led American writers to oppose the conflicts-use of public policy.'02
But public policy, in its conflicts sense, is no more vague than many
generally accepted legal concepts. Public policy does not mean the politi-
99. In the case cited supra note 75.
100. See Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public (1938) 25 VA. L. REV. 37.
101. According to Art. 6 of the French Civil Code, which is the last of the important
Preliminary Provisions of the Code, laws concerning "Tordre public et les bonnes inocurs"
cannot be impaired by private agreement. From this foundation of the contracts-use of
ordre public, the latter term was carried over to private international law. It has since
almost disappeared from the province of contracts. E.g., PLAaI0L-R, Pvn TrAITf;
ETImrNTAI DE DROIT CIVI. (12th ed. 1935), the leading textbook on French civil
law, excelling also in completeness and accuracy, refers rather briefly to ordre public in
the first part (vol. 1. Les Principes Gen&aux 2. Theorie G r&ale des Actes Juridques,
§§ 291, 292) and does not mention it at all in the chapter on contracts (vol. 2) : there is
an isolated reference to ordre public in the chapter on family law, vol. 2, § 1646.
102. Beach, Uniformn Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 Ytam L. J.
656; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and thw Conflict of Laws (1929) 33 YtA.n
L. J. 736, 747; Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine (1935) 19
'Mim. L. REv. 201; Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies (1938) 25 VA. L. REV.
26.
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cal views of the individual judge or of a political party. It is "the mani-
fest will of the state""1 3 and has always been understood in this sense
by the courts. True, mistakes and inconsistencies in the use of the public
policy concept have occurred, but not to such an extent as has been
supposed.104 Whatever the vagueness and inconsistencies of public policy,
they cannot sufficiently explain the attitude of the English and American
courts.
The decisive factor must be sought in the liberal tradition of the
common law courts, which has won definite shape in the century between
the Napoleonic and World Wars. Liberalism postulates international-
mindedness favorable to the recognition of foreign law; but also, in
accord with the doctrine of the division of powers, it strives to keep
courts clean of anything that smacks of politics ; 0" and there is an element
of foreign politics in the conflicts-use of public policy. 00 Those liberal
103. Jacovay v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 634 (1869); Chaffee v. Farmers' Cooperative
Elec. Co., 39 N. D. 585, 160 N. W. 616 (1918). See also Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923).
104. Among the American critics of public policy, Nutting is the most specific in this
respect (loc. cit. supra note 102, at 199, nn. 16-20). His instances, however, are few and
inconclusive. He states that in Aksiairnoye Obschestuo A. M. Luther v. James Sager,
[1921] 3 K. B. 532, the opposite result was reached as in Vladikokasvsky Ry. v. New
York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934). In the English case, a Russian
firm, "nationalized" under Soviet law, brought suit against the English importer of wood
sold to him by the Soviets from the stock of that firm. The suit was dismissed. In the
New York case the claim of the nationalized Russian firm for its New York bank de-
posit was allowed. In the first case the wood had been confiscated in Russia, and the
defendant claimed ownership. The respective adjudications are not irreconcilable. Nut-
ting further refers to Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362 (1898) ; Flagg v.
Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219 (1884); Saxby v. Fulton, [19091 2 K. B. 208, as reflecting
the confusion in gaming cases. The two American cases are in accord, denying for rea-
sons of public policy enforcement to foreign gaming contracts valid under their own law.
The English case allows a claim based on a foreign loan made for the purpose of being
used in gaming, which is a question different from the enforcement of a gaming contract
as such; the main ground of the decision being a restrictive amendment, unknown to
North Carolina and New Jersey law, to the English Gaming Act. The remaining in-
stances are preferred by Nutting only to show that within the New York jurisdiction
conflicting definitions of public policy have been advanced. This would not amount to
much; but it is even questionable whether there is a conflict or rather a mere variety of
definitions.
105. The common law court's dislike of political entanglement was impressively
enunciated by Parker, B., in Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H.L.C.I. 123, 10 Eng. Rep. 408
(1853) (regarding public policy), and by Hamersley, J., in Fischer v. Fielding, 67 Conn.
91, 34 Atl. 714 (1895) (regarding reciprocity in the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments). Both utterances are from parts of minority opinions, but the dissents within the
courts did not bear upon the point before us.
106. The Reichsgericht has repeatedly pointed out that there is a slaafspolitisches
element in judicial determination of public policy. Judgments of March 21, 1905, 60 Ent-
scheidungen in Zivilsachen 296, 300; (March 21, 1905) JURISrISCHa WOCHENSCURIFTr 321;
1928 id. at 2041. This acknowledgment is all the more remarkable since German tradi-
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doctrines are an adequate expression of political conditions of the Vic-
torian era, and they may possess an ultimate validity. Their materializa-
tion, however, presupposes the presence, on the opposite side, of a similar
spirit, lest liberalism result in sheer profit for the illiberal, and in scorn
to the generous. Practicing liberalism becomes preposterous where it is
exercised towards a foreign law which is plainly directed against the
interests of the forum.
The existence of German and other foreign exchange-control is il-
lustrative. As was pointed out,1 7 American courts are inclined to deny
protection to the injured creditor unless there is an American place of
payment or an agreement as to the applicability of American law. It was
likewise shown that the place of payment carries little weight from a
realistic point of view which should certainly prevail in matters of public
policy.
The objective of exchange-control legislation, say that of Ruritania,
to employ Lord Kinnon's term,108 may be briefly described as follows :103
Ruritania is badly in need of foreign exchange, her own currency is
depreciating. Thus, she forbids Ruritania residents to make payments
abroad, on debts or otherwise, except on government permit which will
be granted only in very exceptional cases, and all foreign money held or
acquired by Ruritania residents must be delivered to the Ruritania central
bank, in return for depreciated Ruritania money. This machinery is
directed against foreign creditors of Ruritania residents, who will at
best receive satisfaction in "blocked" Ruritania accounts, the use of
which depends on the whim of Ruritanian authorities. The injury, and
the intended injury, to creditor countries of Ruritania, say to the United
States, is obvious, regardless of such legalistic distinctions as to the "place
of payment." In view of German exchange-control, the Swiss Federal
Court has intrepidly declared it to be "detrimental to Swiss national
economy" and a "spoliative encroachment upon creditors rights." ' And
the American government has repeatedly and in strongest terms pro-
tested against German exchange-control,"' thus giving documentary ex-
pression to American public policy on this question.
Nevertheless, one need not take so extreme a view as to assert that
Ruritania's exchange-control should never be recognized. Where a foreign
tion even more than Anglo-American stresses the absence of political components in the
work of the judiciary. The paramount position of the monarch in the pwlitical field is
an important element in the German tradition.
107. See p. 1042 supra.
108. In the Kleinwort case, supra note 76, at 816.
109. A more detailed analysis may be found in NussB.mnX, op. cit. stpra note 85,
at 475 et seq.
110. judgment of October 8, 1935, Amtliche Sammharg der Entschelidgen, 61 II
242, 248.
111. 5 SEC R.P. oX PROTECTIVE AD REOrG(.%NIZ.TIO\ COMM. (1937) 421 of scq.
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resident brings suit against a Ruritanian only in order to secure a more
favorable jurisdiction, no interest of the forum obviating the application
of Ruritania law is ascertainable. Such a holding was properly made by
a lower Swiss court in a suit brought by a Lichtenstein corporation against
its German debtor.1 2 Yet where suit was brought on a German loan
bond payable in Germany, the Swiss Federal Court found adequate justi-
fication for the preference of Swiss public policy over German exchange-
control in the fact that a fifth of the loan had been floated in Switzer-
land.' In fact, any mentionable economic interest of the forum will
suffice.
This also applies to the case where the creditor is a resident of the
forum. Again, a Swiss court has recognized that a Swiss domicil and
the presence of the German debtor's assets in Switzerland warrant resort
to public policy." 4 In the Werfel case, the New York court was impressed
by the fact that the creditor had moved into this country subsequent to
the making of the contract. Perhaps there would be merit in such a view
where a creditor has moved from Ruritania to the forum on his own
whim. But where he has left Ruritania involuntarily and through no
fault of his own, no reason exists for withholding from a lawful resident
of this country the fullest protection of American law. What the creditor
demands is payment of his debt. If the debtor is compelled to pay what
he owes, no damage is inflicted upon him.'" The interest of the forum
is better safeguarded by employing the Ruritanian's assets for the satis-
faction of a resident creditor, than by allowing the assets to be withdrawn
from the forum and to be delivered to the Ruritanian government, such
withdrawal being possible at any moment under the system of exchange-
control. Perhaps the Ruritanian government needs foreign exchange in
order to prepare a war against the country of the forum. The court
cannot know. The interests of its lawful resident should be nearer to
the forum than the interests of the Ruritanian government.
112. Commercial Court of Berne, Feb. 23, 1939, 41 INSTITUT JURIDIQUn INTMfNA-
TIONTAL BULL 95. The court makes also the point that Swiss public policy was invoked
by the plaintiff in the prosecution of its speculative purposes.
113. judgment of Feb. 1, 1938, Amiliche Saninilung der Entscheidungen, 64 II 88,
104. The fact that a Swiss corporation was the plaintiff, was not taken into account by
the court, because it had been asserted, it seems, that the plaintiff was only a shield for
a foreign party in interest.
In the judgment cited supra note 75, the Hooge Raad resorted to Dutch public policy
though the German bond sued upon did not indicate a Dutch place of payment. The loan,
however, had been floated in Holland, and the German issuer had obligated himself
towards the Amsterdam Stock Exchange to create within Holland facilities for the pay-
ment of the bonds and coupons.
114. Superior Court of Zurich, March 1, 1939, in Thorsch v. Thorsch (not yet pub-
lished).
115. Werfel v. B6hmische Escomptebank, N. 3. L. J., July 20, 1939, p. 161. The
Holzer case, supra note 31, offers a different problem inasmuch as damages for breach of
contract were claimed.*
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'With regard to German-American relations, another point must be
added. Germany has expelled and is still expelling many of her citizens
and stripping them of their property for purely political reasons."' The
attempt of the German government, despite all this, to extend foreign
exchange-control to those expelled is particularly shocking. This country,
however, has made it its publicly announced policy to offer a haven to
the expelled. 7 From the other side of the ocean, the view has sometimes
been voiced that the very test of humaneness is to take care of the dis-
tressed without their property, leaving the latter to the country which
does not feel bound by humanitarian canons. American courts are un-
likely to adopt such views. Obviously, the objectives of declared American
policy will be better served if enforcement of debts owed to refugees is
granted by American courts through realization of American assets of
the refugee's debtors.
One can perfectly well understand that the diverse Ruritanians are
strongly interested in making their exchange-control effective beyond their
frontiers. Still this should be done by treaties such as have been con-
cluded in a great number of cases. As has been pointed out elsewhere,
1 8
it is not for the courts unilaterally to bind their governments in the name
of alleged conflict of laws theories.
In conclusion, it may not be amiss briefly to examine the use of public
policy by foreign courts in cases where the forum at the time of the
decision had itself impaired contracts through adoption of exchange-
control and similar measures. Apart from the 1939 decision of the Dutch
Hooge Raad,"' there seem to be only German examples. Their summary
will further illustrate the view that particular restraint in the use of
public policy is not warranted in the face of foreign measures of the
type mentioned.
As early as 1923,"o the Reichsgericht held valid a contract, made in
1917, in Petrograd, between Russian subjects which provided, in the
116. Under a law of Dec. 12, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1933 I 1733, § 55, preceded by a
similar decree of Dec. 1, 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt 1935 I 1403, a German emigrant remains
subject to restrictions, prohibitions and duties in respect to things regarding which he had
been subject to such restrictions, prohibitions and duties before his emigration. This pro-
vision may, however, be material in litigation between emigrants. NussmATnr, op. cit.
supra note 90, at 497, n. 42.
117. See, e.g., Dep't of State, (1938) Press Releases, p. 411 [of March 24, 1938, ta:-
ing the initiative for the Evian Conference], p. 5,6 [of May 16, regarding President's
Advisory Committee on Political Refugees]. This policy developed subsequently to the
decision of the Holker case. -As rightly suggested in (1938) 3S Co. L. RE,. 1490, 1403,
n. 19, it is not impossible that in a forthcoming similar case the new policy may influence
the view of the court.
118. NussBAuM, op. cit. supra note 90, at 493, giving instances of pertinent treaties
at 507 et seq.
119. See note 75 supra.
120. At that time there had been exchange control, though in a mild form, in Ger-
many since 1919. NussBAkum, DAS GE_. rx TuEoRm .%-D PRAxis rs DEzTscuE:- u.
AusL'mIscHni REciRs (1925) 257, n. 2.
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teeth of Soviet exchange-control, a payment abroad. Foreign exchange-
control legislation was disregarded by the court for reasons of public
policy, the .parties having meanwhile settled in Germany. The court read
into the contract a tacit agreement to the effect that the debt should be
payable at the place of the first non-Russian settlement of the parties,
thus securing a German "place of payment" as a further local "contact."
Here we have non-recognition of foreign (Russian) exchange-control in
an entirely foreign transaction, the only real contact with the forum
being the new German domicil of the parties.' Hungarian exchange-
control law was judicially denied recognition for reasons of German public
policy in the case of a bill of exchange drawn in Germany by a transient
Hungarian on Budapest in terms of American dollars. The Budapest
drawee, because of Hungarian exchange-control, did not pay dollars.
Upon redemption of the bill, a German endorser brought suit against the
drawee. Referring to German public policy, the court gave judgment
to the plaintiff.122 Here again, the contacts with Germany were slight.
They were more substantial in the case of a Hungarian mortgagor of
German real estate who was prevented by Hungarian exchange-control
from discharging his debt in Germany. The appellate court of Berlin,
ignoring the Hungarian prohibition, refused to grant the debtor respite
under the German moratorium law.' 23 American gold clause abrogation
was involved in a Reichsgericht case where suit was brought against a
German public corporation on dollar bonds issued in New York and
subjected to New York law. Gold clause abrogation was denied recogni-
tion in this case, provided the bonds were held by German residents.
124
Thus it appears that the German courts are reluctant to enforce foreign
exchange-control laws and gold clause abrogation, without confining
themselves to a narrow place-of-payment theory.
V. PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERSTATE RELATIONS
In the interstate field there is considerable authority to support the
view that there is, or should be, no place for the use of the public policy
121. Judgment of Oct. 3, 1923, 108 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen
241. Id. Reichsgericht, Oct. 3, 1928, (1928) JURISTISCIIE WOCrINSCRIr 1196, and
Appellate Court of Berlin, April 1, 1926, 1926 id. at 2002. Contra: Appellate Court
of Hamburg, May 16, 1929, (1930) HANSEATISCHE RECHTS--UND GERICHTSZEITSClRIFT
B. 743. In the judgment of Dec. 13, 1929, (1930) WVARINYERS RECUTSPRECHUNa 78, the
Reichsgericht interpreting a very similar situation in a different way used Russian
exchange control law. From the angle of the above discussion, however, it is remark-
able that in this case the plaintiff had abandoned his German domicil prior to the bring-
ing of the suit.
122. Court (Landgericht) of Berlin, Feb. 19, 1932, (1932) JURISTISCua WoMEIN-
SCHRIFT 2306; (1933) 28 INSTITUT JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL BULL. 84.
123. Decree of Oct. 10, 1932, (1932) JVRISTISCHF. "WOCHENSCHRIFT 3773, with ap-
proving annotation by the present writer.
124. Judgment of May 28, 1936, (1936) JURISTISCHE WOcHENSCHIu-T 2058.
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argument. Nearly all of the American writers who have discussed the
question" tend towards this view. Dean Goodrich postulates that in
the interstate area public policy should be "cast out altogether." It has
even been judicially asserted, in a minority opinion, that the differences
among the laws of the several states "relate to minor morals of expediency
and debatable questions of internal policy."'"=
The courts, however, have not followed the course suggested. In Brad-
ford Electric Light Cornpazy, Incorporated v. Clapper, the Supreme Court,
in extending the full faith and credit clause to state statutes, expressly
exempted the case of an adverse public policy of the forum, -7 and this
reservation was reiterated in Pacific Employers Insurance Company ,.
Industrial Accident ConZmission.2s
So long as one contemplates the problem of interstate public policy
in the abstract, everything seems to speak in favor of the critics. The
desirability of having a uniform law throughout the United States and
of eliminating the sources of discord is so manifest that any discussion
almost appears to be a waste of time.
The picture, however, changes if one tackles concrete situations as
suggested by actual cases. Suppose that forum F has declared lottery
contracts unlawful, and an F resident and citizen enters into a lottery
contract in X where such contracts are valid."2 AWVhy should F be com-
pelled, in a suit by or against that resident, to subordinate its policy to
the policy of X? Or suppose that F has comprehensive small-loan legis-
lation which limits interest to two and one-half per cent monthly, and
an F resident is a party to a small loan contract involving a higher rate
of interest, but made and to be performed in X where higher interest
rates are permitted.3 Would not enforcing the higher rate of interest
in that case invite evasion and jeopardize the success of F's small-loan
legislation? Or X's bank legislation favors depositors in the case of a
bank's insolvency to such an extent that not much will be left to other
creditors. If the courts of F, because of a divergent public policy, dis-
regard that privilege in wholly F transactions with regard to forum prop-
125. See note 102 su pra. STrmtBERG. op. cit. stipra note 11, at 152, more reservedly
remarks that the courts "should confine local public policy w.ithin narrow limits."
126. Crouch. J., in Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 475; 3 N. E. (2d) 597, 600 (1936).
127. 286 U. S. 145 (1932).
128. 305 U. S. 563 (1939). The restriction imposed upon the state courts by the Bel-
mwnt case, p. 1046 supra, is different in character. And of course state public policy is in-
effective in the face of divergent federal legislation. Mondou v. New York, X. H. & H.
IL R., 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
129. See Watson v. Murray, 23 N. J. Eq. 257 (1872).
130. See Personal Finance Co. of Council Bluffs v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450,
255 N. W. 558 (1934), cert. denied. 293 U. S. 627 (1935); Continental Adjustment Corp.
v% Klause, 12 N. J. Misc. 703, 174 Ad. 246 (D. Ct. 1934); Folsom v. Continental Adjust-
ment Corp., 48 Ga. App. 435, 172 S. E. 833 (1934).
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erty of the bank,' ought such a course to be condemned simply as local
fancy? Or where the F law grants to injured workers more liberal com-
pensation than does the X law, and the injury of an F worker happened
in X and would under general conflict rules be judged according to the
law of X, should the F courts be prevented from applying the better local
scale of compensation for no other reason than bias against the public
policy doctrine ?132
In Mertz v. Mertz, 3 3 a good phrase was suggested to describe the
appropriate function of public policy in conflicts situations. As will be
remembered, in that case a New York wife had brought suit against
her husband according to Connecticut law and the court, rightly or
wrongly, examined the situation from the angle of public policy. Con-
ceding as a matter of argument that New York disallowance of such
suits is outdated, Judge Lehman stated that the courts should not "trans-
form an anachronism into an anomaly."' 34 Avoidance in the administra-
tion of the law of "anomalies" originating in an improper use of foreign
law is an objective which expresses rather adequately the function of
public policy in the interstate as well as in the international area.
Disturbing though the constitutional theory of delegated powers and
the ensuing multitude of state laws might appear in the light of recent
developments, elimination of the public policy rule in interstate relations
would hardly be a proper means to overcome present difficulties. The
result of such elimination would be to intensify existing and inevitable
discrepancies by injecting them into the inner economic and social setting
of the states. And it cannot be maintained that the trend is towards
lessening those discrepancies. State legislative experimentation is going
on and may be extended in the future.'35 Opportunity of territorially
limited experimentation has been recommended as one of the advantages
of the American constitutional system. The public policy rule operates
as a guarantee that such experimentation will not affect the "sphere of
interest" of other states; a guarantee independent of conflict of laws rules
which assign the cases to the several legal systems from an entirely
different angle.
The preceding views find strong support in the Alaska Packers and
Pacific Employment Insurance cases. Since in these cases the California
legislature was held empowered to extend the operation of the California
131. See Washington Alaska Bank v. Dexter Horton Nat. Bank, 263 Fed. 204 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1920).
132. The negative answer seems to be authorized by Pacific Employers Ins. Co. V.
Industrial Accident Comm., 305 U. S. 563 (1939).
133. 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
134. Id. at 474, 3 N. E. (2d) at 600.
135. See De Courcy, Slate Trade Barriers to Interstate Commerce in 2 COMPARATIVE
LAW SERIES (Dep't of Commerce 1937) 172.
[Vol. 49: 10271054
PUBLIC POLICY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
Workmen's Compensation Act to cases which under ordinary conflict
of laws rules might have come within the range of other than California
law, there is no obligation or principle generally withholding from the
state courts a similar power based on the public policy rule. It is only
the Constitution which furnishes checks against unsound territorial ex-
pansion of state law ; ' "checks" rather than "boundaries" because the
laws of the several states may overlap each other, as is made clear in
the Pacific Employment Insurance case.
Because of the constitutional implications of the matter, the compara-
tive approach is not particularly helpful in the situation. However, a
German pre-war instance, originating in the diversity of state laws under
the 1871 constitution, may be mentioned. The Prussian mother of an
illegitimate child of eleven years, mother and child being Prussian nation-
als and Hamburg residents, wished to have the child educated in the
Protestant religion, contrary to the wish of the child's guardians. But
Prussian law, applicable according to Hamburg conflicts rules, did not
permit a change of the child's religion prior to his fourteenth year. Never-
theless, the appellate court of Hamburg discarded the Prussian provision
as contrary to religious freedom guaranteed by the Hamburg Constitu-
tion.137
The case suggests that the public policy problem in interstate relations
may assume a grave political character. One may recall the tensions in
the interstate field relating to the slavery situation."'5 Similar strains,
fortunately, no longer exist among the several states. However, fascist
tendencies have temporarily prevailed in one state. Also from a political
point of view, it would be unwise definitively to lay down the public
policy weapon only to satisfy a theory.
136. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (1918) and other cases not to be discussed here.
137. Reichsgericht, judgment of Sept. 25, 1913, Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung, Beiblatt
1914, n. 235. The Tribunal Civil of Libourne, in a judgment of February 24, 1921, Rnvun
JTuXD iuE DE I'ALSACE ET DE LoRRA=nE 391, was concerned with a suit brought on
behalf of an Alsacian minor against his illegitimate French father for alimony on the
basis of the German law, maintained as "local law" by the French legislation subsequent
to the Treaty of Versailles. The defense that the claim was contrary to French public
policy was rejected by the court on the ground that the "local law" was to be considered
as "veritable French law." No other pertinent continental cases are inown to this writer,
but the two mentioned indicate that the public policy problem in so far as it originates in
a diversity of local law systems within the same political unit, can only be solved vth
an eye to the political structure of that unit and of the territorial segments thereof which
are endowed with a legal system of their own. For a general discussion, see ELIESCO,
EssAi suR L.s CoNFITs DE Lois (1925) 71, 72, and Knapp, mipra note 56, at 159.
138. See, e.g., Minor v. Cardwell, 37 Mo. 350 (1866) ; Jocervy v. Dunton, 25 Ark. 623
(1869). The Dred Scott case, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1M54) was not decided on conflicts
grounds, but the problem before us was clearly presented.
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VI. PUBLIC POLICY AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
It is a universally recognized principle that a foreign judgment will
not be accorded recognition if a public policy of the forum would thereby
be violated.'39 Application of a foreign legal system is not directly in-
volved in this situation. The court is merely confronted with a special act
of a foreign sovereignty, addressed solely to the parties in litigation.
Recognition is first predicated upon technical requirements, such as proper
jurisdiction of the foreign court, fair trial in that court and the existence
of reciprocity. The merits of the foreign judgment will not be examined
by the forum, except in so far as its public policy is challenged. Con-
sequently, the technical requirements being fulfilled, recognition is the
norm, non-recognition, because of public policy, the exception, exactly
as in the choice of laws situation. Also the range of relevant public
policy is ordinarily the same here and there." Yet there are differences.
In the international area the practical importance of the problem before
us is very limited. Barring (a) divorce and other judgments on status
and (b) the existence of pertinent bilateral treatie6, such recognition is
actually rare. A well-known obstacle consists in the prerequisite of rec-
iprocity, enunciated by the Supreme Court 14' and some of the state
courts.'42 Also the other requirements and the difficulties of having the
foreign judgment properly authenticated have a discouraging effect.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising .that, in the international
area, only one American case denying recognition to a foreign judgment
for reasons of public policy' 48 has been discovered. The greater fre-
quency of recognition of foreign divorce judgments did not augment
the number of public policy decisions since in divorce matters the interests
of the forum is focused on the question of jurisdiction. Where the spouses
had their domicil in the foreign country whose courts granted the divorce,
American courts, in recognizing the divorce, will not bother about the
grounds of the divorce.'
44
139. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 445; NiBOYET, MANUEL DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVk (1928) 932; German Zivilprocessordnung § 328(1) (4) ; Italian Co-
dice di Procedura Civile, Art. 941 (4).
140. In continental law there is a kindred use of public policy in connection with Let-
ters Rogatory which on the basis of treaties or international custom must be performed,
under the caveat.; moreover, that the public policy of the state applied to, will not be
violated. See, e.g., 4 LAPRADELLE AND NIBOYET, REPERTOIRE DE DROIr INTERNATIONAL
(1929) 77. In this country, the matter is entirely within the court's discretion.
141. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1895).
142. Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 793, 75 So. 35; Traders Co. v. Davidson, 146
Minn. 224, 178 N. W. 735 (1920); Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 645,
147 Atl. 715, 717 (1929).
143. De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1873).
144. See, e.g., GOODRIcH, op. cit. supra note 21, at 340, n. 22.
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'With respect to money judgments rendered by courts of sister states,
the problem of public policy possesses a much greater practical signifi-
cance. It is generally believed that such judgments must be enforced
within the United States even where they are utterly repugnant to the
law of the forum. 4 5 This rule is supposed to follow from the full faith
and credit clause, an argument obviously unconvincing, since in the case
of statutes the Supreme Court has maintained the public policy rule in
the teeth of that clause. Still it is true that as a matter of sound policy
enforcement of state judgments throughout the Union should be favored.
For example, where the law of the forum was in terms applied, but
misapprehended by the foreign court, the forum should not be allowed
to deny recognition under the pretense that the judgment violates the
public policy of the forum.1"' The same would be true of erroneous
or incomplete fact findings of the first judgment." Such isolated mis-
takes are less dangerous to the forum than disregard of its laws, and
they may come under the principle that the forum, not acting in appellate
capacity, must not reconsider the merits of the original decision. The
American cases rejecting the public policy argument can nearly all be
explained on one or the other of these grounds, 148 or on the ground
that the divergence of the F law from the X law was not "strong"
145. RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcT OF L.tws (1934) § 446; GoopRicn, op. di. supra note
21, at 541.
146. This seems to be the point in Fountleroy v. Lumm, 210 U. S. 230 (1903), where
enforcement of a Missouri judgment was sought in Mississippi. Said the court: "The
judgment cannot be impeached in Mississippi even if it went upon a misapprehension of
the 'Mississippi law." The Missouri court no doubt supposed that the award (on which
the suit was brought) was binding under the law of Mississippi. Unmistakable is Mac-
Donald v. Grand Trunk Ry., 71 N. H. 448, 52 AtI. 982 (1902), where the public policy
defense was held not to be justified by the fact that in rendering the judgment a mistake
was made as to the law of New Hampshire, especially when, as in this case "the (orig-
inal) court is led into error by the failure of the complaining party to inform it as to
the foreign law."
147. This may have been the situation in Engineers Nat. Bank v. Drew, 311 Pa. 59,
166 Atl. 376 (1933). The original judgment had been rendered by an Ohio court against
a wife as surety for her husband, she allegedly residing in Pennsylvania, whose laws held
such sureties by Pennsylvania wives void. Perhaps the Ohio court had found, right or
wrong, that she did not reside in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania court had no power to
go behind this statement. The same rule has been recognized in the international area,
see Godard v. Gray, [1870] 6 Q. B. 138, and Nussmum, DEuTscuEs INA. o:.L
PRIVATRECHT (1932) 436, n. 2 citing German cases.
148. An exception is Beal v. Carpenter, 235 F. 273 (C. C. A. Sth, 1916), where Arkan-
sas was compelled to enforce against her strong public policy a New York judgment up-
holding a contract on cotton futures. There is in the federal courts an aversion, ques-
tionable in this writer's opinion, to those state laws by which states with a less commer-
cialized populace try to protect their residents from the effects of gambling at the stock
and produce exchanges.
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enough to warrant the use of the public policy weapon.'49 Despite the
sweeping language of some of the cases, it is very doubtful whether the
dominant doctrine can be maintained which would entirely eliminate
public policy considerations from the examination of sister-state judg-
ments. Suppose the X court gives judgment against an F citizen, dis-
carding the F law (e.g., on a small-loan act), applicable under conflicts
rules, as contrary to the X public policy. Compelling F to enforce this
judgment means a preference of the X law over the F law to be ef-
fectuated by the F courts themselves. Apart from the political impropriety
involved, this course may practically result in an undermining of the F
statute. There is no judicial authority for such a course. 1 0 It may be
hoped that the Supreme Court, should it become concerned with the
problem, will reach a solution as just and statesmanlike as were its two
last conflicts decisions on workmen's compensation.
149. This is obvious.in Westwater v. Murray, 245 F. 427 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917), where
suit was allowed on a Pennsylvania promissory note providing for an allowance of attor-
ney services, a clause not permitted by the forum, but nevertheless held valid. The
opinion speaks of "declared policy" rather than of "public policy" of the forum. Hieston
v. National City Bank, 280 Fed. 525 (1922), may perhaps be included in this group. The
situation was similar as in the Drew case, supra note 147, where the wife's residence was
not indicated. Suppose the residence was outside the forum, no strong public policy of
the latter could have been involved.
150. As to Fountleroy v. Lumm, see note 146 supra.
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